Abstract. Conceptual structuralism is a non-realist philosophy of mathematics according to which the objects of mathematical thought are humanly conceived "ideal-world" structures. Basic conceptions of structures, such as those of the natural numbers, the continuum, and sets in the cumulative hierarchy, differ in their degree of clarity. One may speak of what is true in a given conception, but that notion of truth may be partial. Mathematics proceeds from such basic conceptions by reflective expansion and carefully reasoned argument, the last of which is analyzed in logical terms. The main questions for the role of logic here is whether there are principled demarcations on its use. It is claimed that in the case of a completely clear conception, such as that of the natural numbers, the logical notions are just those of first-order classical logic and hence that that is the appropriate vehicle for reasoning. At the other extreme, in the case of set theory, where each set is conceived of as a definite totality but the universe of "all" sets is an indefinite totality, it is proposed that the appropriate logic is semi-intuitionistic in which classical logic applies only to (set-) bounded formulas. Certain subsystems of classical set theory in which extensive parts of mathematics can be formalized are reducible to these semi-intuitionistic systems, thus justifying the de facto use of classical logic in mathematical practice at least to that reach.
terms of basic ones such as these. As to proofs, even though current standards of rigor require closely reasoned arguments, most mathematicians make no explicit reference to the role of logic in them, and few of them have studied logic in any systematic way.
When mathematicians consider axioms, instead it is for specific kinds of structures: groups, rings, fields, linear spaces, topological spaces, metric spaces, Hilbert spaces, categories, etc., etc. Principles of a foundational character are rarely mentioned, if at all, except on occasion for proof by contradiction and proof by induction. The least upper bound principle on bounded sequences or sets of real numbers is routinely applied without mention. Some notice is paid to applications of the Axiom of Choice. To a side of the mainstream are those mathematicians such as constructivists or semiconstructivists who reject one or another of commonly accepted principles, but even for them the developments are largely informal with little explicit attention to logic. And, except for some far outliers, what they do is still recognizable as mathematics to the mathematician in the mainstream.
Turning now to the logicians' perspective, one major aim is to model mathematical practice⎯ranging from the local to the global⎯in order to draw conclusions about its potentialities and limits. In this respect, then, mathematical logicians have their own practice; here I shall sketch it and only later take up the question how well it meets that aim. In brief: Concepts are tied down within formal languages and proofs within formal systems, while truth, be it for the mainstream or for the outliers, is explained in semantic terms. Some familiar formal systems for the mainstream are Peano Arithmetic (PA), Second-Order Arithmetic (PA 2 ), and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF); Heyting Arithmetic (HA) is an example of a formal system for the margin. In their intended or "standard" interpretations, PA and HA deal specifically with the natural numbers, PA 2 deals with the natural numbers and arbitrary sets of natural numbers, while ZF deals with the sets in the cumulative hierarchy. Considering syntax only, in each case the wellformed formulas of each of these systems are generated from its atomic formulas (corresponding to the basic concepts involved) by closing under some or all of the "logical" operations of negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication, universal and existential quantification.
The case of PA 2 requires an aside; in that system the quantifiers are applied to both the first-order and second-order variables. But we must be careful to distinguish the logic of quantification over the second-order variables as it is applied formally within PA 2 from its role in second-order logic under the so-called standard interpretation. In order to distinguish systematically between the two, I shall refer to the former as syntactic or formal second-order logic and the latter as semantic or interpreted second-order logic. In its pure form over any domain for the first-order variables, semantic second-order logic takes the domain of the second-order variables to be the supposed totality of arbitrary subsets of that domain; in its applied form, the domain of first-order variables has some specified interpretation. As an applied second-order formal system, PA 2 may equally well be considered to be a two-sorted first-order theory; the only thing that acknowledges its intended second-order interpretation is the inclusion of the so-called Comprehension
Axiom Scheme: that consists of all formulas of the form ∃X∀x[x ∈X ↔ A(x,…)] where
A is an arbitrary formula of the language of PA 2 in which 'X' does not occur as a free variable. Construing things in that way, the formal logic of all of the above-mentioned systems may be taken to be first-order. Now, it is a remarkable fact that all the formal systems that have been set up to model mathematical practice are in effect based on first-order logic, more specifically its classical system for mainstream mathematics and its intuitionistic system for constructive mathematics. (While there are formal systems that have been proposed involving extensions of first-order logic by, for example, modal operators, the purpose of such has been philosophical. These operators are not used by mathematicians as basic or defined mathematical concepts or to reason about them.) One can say more about why this is so than that it happens to be so; that is addressed below.
The third perspective to consider on the nature and role of logic in mathematics is that of the philosopher of mathematics. Here there are a multitude of positions to consider; the principal ones are logicism (and neo-logicism), "platonic" realism, constructivism, formalism, finitism, predicativism, naturalism, and structuralism. 1 Roughly speaking, in all of these except for constructivism, finitism and formalism, classical first-order logic is 1 Most of these are surveyed in the excellent collection Shapiro (2005) .
either implicitly taken for granted or explicitly accepted. In constructivism (of the three exceptions) the logic is intuitionistic, i.e. it differs from the classical one by the exclusion of the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). According to formalism, any logic may be chosen for a formal system. In finitism, the logic is restricted to quantifier-free formulas for decidable predicates; hence it is a fragment of both classical and intuitionistic logic.
At the other extreme, classical second-order logic is accepted in set-theoretic realism, and that underlies both scientific and mathematical naturalism; it is also embraced in in re structuralism. Modal structuralism, on the other hand, expands that via modal logic. The accord with mathematical practice is perhaps greatest with mathematical naturalism, which simply takes practice to be the given to which philosophical methodology must respond. But the structuralist philosophies take the most prominent conceptual feature of modern mathematics as their point of departure.
Conceptual structuralism. This is an ontologically non-realist philosophy of mathematics that I have long advanced; my main concern here is to elaborate the nature and role of logic within it. I have summarized this philosophy in Feferman (2009) via the following ten theses. 1. The basic objects of mathematical thought exist only as mental conceptions, though the source of these conceptions lies in everyday experience in manifold ways, in the processes of counting, ordering, matching, combining, separating, and locating in space and time.
2. Theoretical mathematics has its source in the recognition that these processes are independent of the materials or objects to which they are applied and that they are potentially endlessly repeatable.
3. The basic conceptions of mathematics are of certain kinds of relatively simple idealworld pictures that are not of objects in isolation but of structures, i.e. coherently conceived groups of objects interconnected by a few simple relations and operations.
They are communicated and understood prior to any axiomatics, indeed prior to any systematic logical development.
4. Some significant features of these structures are elicited directly from the worldpictures that describe them, while other features may be less certain. Mathematics needs little to get started and, once started, a little bit goes a long way.
5. Basic conceptions differ in their degree of clarity or definiteness. One may speak of what is true in a given conception, but that notion of truth may be partial. Truth in full is applicable only to completely definite conceptions.
6. What is clear in a given conception is time dependent, both for the individual and historically.
7. Pure (theoretical) mathematics is a body of thought developed systematically by successive refinement and reflective expansion of basic structural conceptions.
8. The general ideas of order, succession, collection, relation, rule and operation are premathematical; some implicit understanding of them is necessary to the understanding of mathematics.
9. The general idea of property is pre-logical; some implicit understanding of that and of the logical particles is also a prerequisite to the understanding of mathematics. The reasoning of mathematics is in principle logical, but in practice relies to a considerable extent on various forms of intuition in order to arrive at understanding and conviction.
10. The objectivity of mathematics lies in its stability and coherence under repeated communication, critical scrutiny and expansion by many individuals often working independently of each other. Incoherent concepts, or ones that fail to withstand critical examination or lead to conflicting conclusions are eventually filtered out from mathematics. The objectivity of mathematics is a special case of intersubjective objectivity that is ubiquitous in social reality.
Two basic structural conceptions. These theses are illustrated in Feferman (2009) by the conception of the structure of the positive integers on the one hand and by several conceptions of the continuum on the other. Since our main purpose here is to elaborate the nature and role of logic in such structural conceptions, it is easiest to review here what I wrote there, except that I shall limit myself to the set-theoretical conception of the continuum in the latter case.
The most primitive mathematical conception is that of the positive integer sequence as represented by the tallies: |, ||, |||, .... From the structural point of view, our conception is that of a structure (N + , 1, Sc, <), where N + is generated from the initial unit 1 by closure under the successor operation Sc, and m < n if m precedes n in the generation procedure.
Certain facts about this structure (if one formulates them explicitly at all), are evident:
that < is a total ordering of N + for which 1 is the least element, and that m < n implies
Reflecting on a given structure may lead us to elaborate it by adjoining further relations and operations and to expand basic principles accordingly. For example, in the case of N + , thinking of concatenation of tallies immediately leads us to the operation of addition, m + n, and that leads us to m × n as "m added to itself n times".
The basic properties of the + and × operations such as commutativity, associativity, distributivity, and cancellation are initially recognized only implicitly. We may then go on to introduce more distinctively mathematical notions such as the relations of divisibility and congruence and the property of being a prime number. In this language, a wealth of interesting mathematical statements can already be formulated and investigated as to their truth or falsity, for example, that there are infinitely many twin prime numbers, that there are no odd perfect numbers, Goldbach's conjecture, and so on. At a further stage of reflection we may recognize the least number principle for the natural numbers, namely if P(n) is any well-defined property of members of N and there is some n such that P(n) holds then there is a least such n. More advanced reflection leads to general principles of proof by induction and definition by recursion on N.
Furthermore, the general scheme of induction,
is taken to be open-ended in the sense that it is accepted for any definite property P of natural numbers that one meets in the process of doing mathematics, no matter what the subject matter and what the notions used in the formulation of P. The question⎯What is a definite property?⎯requires in each instance the mathematician's judgment. For example, the property, "n is an odd perfect number," is definite, while "n is a feasibly computable number" is not, nor is "n is the number of grains of sand in a heap."
Turning now to the continuum, in Feferman (2009) I isolated several conceptions of it ranging from the straight line in Euclidean geometry through the system of real numbers to the set of all subsets of the natural numbers. The reason that these are all commonly referred to as the continuum is that they have the same cardinal number; however, that ignores essential conceptual differences. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to concentrate on the last of these concepts. The general idea of set or collection of objects is of course ancient, but it only emerged as an object of mathematical study at the hands of Georg Cantor in the 1870s. Given the idea of an arbitrary set X of elements of any given set D, considered independently of how membership in X may be defined, we write S(D) for the conception of the totality of all subsets X of D. Then the continuum in the set-theoretical sense is simply that of the set S(N) of all subsets of N. This may be regarded as a two-sorted structure, (N, S(N), ∈), where ∈is the relation of membership of natural numbers to sets of natural numbers. Two principles are evident for this conception, using letters 'X', 'Y' to range over S(N) and 'n' to range over N.
What is problematic here for conceptual structuralism is the meaning of 'all' in the description of S(N) as comprising all subsets of N. According to the usual set-theoretical view, S(N) is a definite totality, so that quantification over it is well-determined and may be used to express definite properties P. But again that requires on the face of it a realist ontology and in that respect goes beyond conceptual structuralism. So if we do not subscribe to that, we may want to treat S(N) as indefinite in the sense that it is openended. Of course this is not to deny that we recognize many properties P as definite such as⎯to begin with⎯all those given by first-order formulas in the language of the structure (N, 0, Sc, <, +, ×) (i.e. those that are ordinarily referred to as the arithmetical properties); thence any sets defined by such properties are recognized to belong to S(N).
Incidentally, even from this perspective one can establish categoricity of the Extensionality and Comprehension principles for the structure (N, S(N), ∈) relative to N in a straightforward way as follows. Suppose given another structure (N, S′(N), ∈′), satisfying the principles I and II, using set variables 'X′' and 'Y′' ranging over S′ (N) . Given an X in S(N), let P(n) be the definite property, n ∈X. Using
Comprehension for the structure (N, S′(N), ∈′), one obtains existence of an X′ such that for all n in N, n ∈X iff n ∈X′; then X′ is unique by Extensionality. This gives a one-one map of S(N) into S′(N) preserving N and the membership relation; it is seen to be an onto map by reversing the argument. This is to be compared with the standard set-theoretical view of categoricity results as exemplified, for example, in Shapiro (1997) and Isaacson (2011) . According to that view, the subject matter of mathematics is structures, and the mère structures of mathematics such as the natural numbers, the continuum (in one of its various guises), and suitable initial segments of the cumulative hierarchy of sets are characterized by axioms in full second-order logic; that is, any two structures satisfying the same such axioms are isomorphic. 3 On that account, the proofs of categoricity in one way or another then appeal prima facie to the presumed totality of arbitrary subsets of any given set. given that the assumption of S(N) as a definite totality is a purely hypothetical and philosophically problematic one, the best we can rightly say is that in that picture, everything proved of the natural numbers is true.
Incidentally, all of this and more comes into question when we move one type level up to the structure (N, S(N), S(S(N)), ∈ 1 , ∈ 2 ) in which Cantor's continuum hypothesis may be formulated. A more extensive discussion of the conception of that structure and the question of its definiteness in connection with the continuum problem is given in Feferman (2011) . We shall also see below how taking N and S(N) to be definite but
S(S(N)
) to be open-ended can be treated in suitable formal systems.
Where and why classical first-order logic? Logic, as I affirmed at the outset, is supposed to provide us with all those forms of reasoning that lead invariably from truths to truths, i.e. it is given by an essential combination of inferential and semantical notions.
But from the point of view of conceptual structuralism, the classical notion of truth in a structure need not be applicable unless we are dealing with a conception (such as that of the structure of natural numbers) for which the basic domains are definite totalities and the basic notions are definite operations, predicates and relations. It is clear that at least the classical first-order predicate calculus should be admitted both on semantical and inferential grounds, since we have Gödel's completeness theorem to provide us with a complete inferential system. But why not more? For example, model-theorists have introduced generalized quantifiers such as the cardinality quantifiers (Q κ x)P (x) expressing that there are at least κ individuals x satisfying the property P, where κ is any infinite cardinal; one could certainly consider adjoining those to the first-order formalism.
A much more general class of quantifiers defined by set-theoretical means was introduced by Lindström (1966) ; each of those can be used to extend first-order logic with a model-theoretic semantics for arbitrary first-order domains. But for which such extensions do we have a completeness theorem like that of Gödel's for first-order logic?
It is well known that no such theorem is possible for the quantifier (Q ω x)P(x) which expresses that there are infinitely many x such that P(x). For, using that quantifier and thence its dual ("there are just finitely many x such that P(x)") we can characterize the structure of natural numbers up to isomorphism, so all the truths of that structure are valid sentences in the logic. But the set of such truths is not effectively enumerable, indeed far from it, so it is not given by an effectively specified formal system of reasoning.
Surprisingly, Keisler (1970) obtained a completeness theorem for the quantifier (Q κ x)P(x) when κ is any uncountable cardinal; as it happens, that has the same set of valid formulas as for the case that κ is the first uncountable cardinal. In view of the leap over the case κ = ω, one may suspect that the requirement that the set of valid formulas be given by some effective set of axioms and rules of inference is not sufficient to express completeness in the usual intended sense. We need to say something more about how such axioms and rules of inference ought specifically to be complete for a given quantifier. The key is given by Gentzen's (1935) system of natural deduction NK (or sequent calculus LK) where each connective and quantifier in the classical first-order predicate calculus is specified by Introduction and Elimination rules for that operation only. Moreover, for each pair of such rules, any two connectives or quantifiers satisfying them are equivalent, i.e. they implicitly determine the operator in question. So a strengthened condition on a proposed addition by a generalized quantifier Q to our firstorder language is that it be given by axioms and rules of inference for which there is at most one operator satisfying them. That was the proposal of Zucker (1978) in which he gave a theorem to the effect that any such quantifier is definable in the first-order predicate calculus. In particular, that would apply to the Lindström quantifiers. However, there were some defects in Zucker's statement of his theorem and its proof; I have given a corrected version of both in Feferman (t.a.). To summarize: we have fully satisfactory semantic and inferential criteria for a logic to deal with structures whose domains are first-order and that are completely definite in the sense described above, and these limit us to the standard first-order classical logic.
Let us turn now to conceptions of structures with second-order or higher order domains, such as (N, S(N), ∈, …) where the ellipsis indicates that this augments an arithmetical structure on N such as (N, 0, Sc, <, +, ×). Again, if S(N) is considered as a definite totality, the classical notion of truth is applicable and the semantics of second-order logic must be accepted. But as is well known there is no complete inferential system that accompanies that, since again the arithmetical structure is categorically axiomatized in this semantics and in consequence the set of its truths is not effectively enumerable. In any case, as I have argued above, S(N) ought not to be considered as a definite totality; to claim otherwise, is to accept the problematic realist ontology of set theory. As Quine famously put it, second-order logic is "set theory in sheep's clothing." Boolos (1975 Boolos ( , 1984 tried to get around this via a reduction of second-order logic to a "nominalistic" system of plural quantification. This was incisively critiqued by Resnik in his article "Second-order logic still wild": "Boolos is involved in a circle: he uses second-order quantification to explain English plural quantification and uses this, in turn, to explain second-order quantification." (Resnik 1988, p. 83) .
Though the Lindström quantifiers are restricted to apply to first-order structures and thus bind only individual variables they may well be defined using higher order notions in an essential way, in particular those needed for the cardinality quantifiers. Another example where the syntax is first-order on the face of it but the semantics is decidedly secondorder is IF ("Independence Friendly") logic, due to Hintikka (1996) . This uses formulas Where and why intuitionistic first-order logic? Now let us turn to the question which logic is appropriate to structural conceptions that are taken to lack some aspect of definiteness. Offhand, one might expect the answer in that case to be intuitionistic logic, but the matter is more delicate. The problem is that there is not one clear-cut semantics for it; among others that have been considered, one has the so-called BHK interpretation,
Kripke semantics, topological semantics, sheaf models, etc., etc. Of these, the first is the most principled one with respect to the basic ideas of constructivity; it is that that leads one directly to intuitionistic logic but it does not determine it via a precise completeness result. By contrast, as we shall see, not only does Kripke semantics take care of the latter but it relates more closely to the question of dealing with conceptions of structures involving possibly indefinite notions and domains. For the details concerning both of these I refer to Troelstra and van Dalen (1988) , a comprehensive exposition of constructivism in mathematics that includes treatments of the great variety of semantics and proof theory that have been developed for intuitionistic systems.
The BHK (Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogoroff) constructive explanation of the connectives and quantifiers is described in Troelstra and van Dalen (1988) 
Then the completeness theorem for this semantics is that a formula A is valid in all Kripke models iff it is provable in the first-order intuitionistic predicate calculus. We shall see in the next section how Kripke models can be generalized to take into account differences as to definiteness of basic relations and domains.
Satisfying as this completeness theorem may be, there remains the question whether one might not add connectives or quantifiers to those of intuitionistic logic while retaining some form of its semantics. Though intuitionistic logic is part of classical logic, the semantical and inferential criterion above for classical logic doesn't apply because of the differences in the semantical notions. But just as for the classical case, on the inferential side each of the connectives and quantifiers of the intuitionistic first-order predicate calculus is uniquely identified via Introduction and Elimination rules in Gentzen's natural deduction system NJ. Even more, Gentzen first formulated the idea that the meaning of each of the above operations is given by its characteristic inferences. Actually, Gentzen claimed more: he wrote that "the [Introduction rules] represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned" (Gentzen 1969, p. 80 ). Prawitz supported this by means of his Inversion Principle (Prawitz 1965, p. 33) : namely, it follows from the normalization theorem for NJ that each Elimination rule for a given operation can be recovered from the appropriate one of its Introduction rules when that is the last step in a normal derivation. Without subscribing at all to this proposed reduction of semantics to inferential roles, we may ask whether any further operators may be added via suitable Introduction rules. The answer to that in the negative was provided by the work of Zucker and Tragesser (1978) Of course the basic predicates come with specified arities to show what sorts of objects they relate, and the variables in the first-order language over these predicates are always of a specified sort. Then the definition of the valuation function on arbitrary formulas for a many-sorted structure (K, I, ≤, D, v) proceeds in the same way as above. Now an n-ary Now the membership relation is definite because sets are taken to be definite objects, i.e.
if X is in both the collections k and k′ then n ∈ X holds in the same way whether evaluated in k or in k′. So classical logic applies to all formulas A that contain no bound set variables, though they may contain free set variables, i.e. A is what is usually called a predicative formula. But when dealing with formulas in general, only intuitionistic logic is justified on this picture. This leads us to the consideration of semi-intuitionistic (or semi-constructive) theories in general, i.e. theories in which the basic underlying logic is intuitionistic, but classical logic is taken to apply to a class of formulas distinguished by containing definite predicates and quantified variables ranging over definite domains. A number of such theories have been treated in the paper Feferman (2010) , corresponding to different structural notions in which certain domains are taken to be definite and others indefinite. They fall into three basic groups: (i) predicative theories, (ii) theories of countable (tree) ordinals, and (iii) theories of sets. The general pattern is that in each case one has a semi-intuitionistic version of a corresponding classical system, and they are shown to be proof-theoretically equivalent and to coincide on the classical part.
Moreover, the same holds when the semi-intuitionistic system is augmented by various principles such as the Axiom of Choice (AC) that would make the corresponding classical system much stronger. It is not possible here to explain the results in adequate detail, so only some of the ideas behind the formulations of the systems involved is sketched. The reader who prefers to avoid even the technicalities that remain can easily skim (or even skip) the rest of this section.
(i) Semi-intuitionistic predicative theories. Here the language of arithmetic is extended by variables for function(al)s in all finite types; following Gödel (1958 Gödel ( , 1972 in his socalled Dialectica interpretation, we also add primitive recursive functionals in all finite types. In many-sorted intuitionistic logic, the system obtained is denoted HA ω . In the process of obtaining reduction to a quantifier-free system, Gödel showed that this system is of the same strength as Peano Arithmetic, PA; in fact the same holds for HA ω + AC.
Now the latter is turned into a semi-intuitionistic system by adding the Law of Excluded
Middle for all arithmetical formulas. For the proof-theoretical work on that, it proves to be more convenient to add the least-number operator µ and an axiom (µ) that says that when the operator is applied to a function f: N → N for which there exists an n with f(n) = 0, it yields the least such n. Under this axiom, all arithmetical formulas become equivalent to quantifier-free (QF) formulas, for which the LEM then holds. Thus one is led to consider HA ω + AC + (µ), which turns out to be proof-theoretically equivalent to expresses that the set f is a function in the set-theoretical sense, and where now A is an arbitrary formula of the language of set-theory. Under the assumption AC S we can infer Collection for arbitrary formulas and hence Replacement for arbitrary formulas. Finally, since sets are considered to be definite totalities, we obtain a semi-intuitionistic system from IKP by adjoining the law of excluded middle for Δ 0 formulas. The main result of
Feferman (2010) is that the semi-intuitionistic system IKP + AC S + Δ 0 -LEM is of the same proof-theoretical strength as KP and hence of ID 1 in its classical and intuitionistic forms. Moreover, if we add the Power Set Axiom (Pow) we obtain a system that is of strength between that of KP + Pow and that of KP + Pow + (V = L). Conceptual structuralism addresses the question of existence and truth in mathematics in a way that accords with both the historical development of the subject and each individual's intellectual development. It crucially identifies mathematical concepts as being embedded in a social matrix that has given rise, among other things, to social institutions and games; like them, mathematics allows substantial intersubjective agreement, and like them, its concepts are understood without assuming reification.
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What makes mathematics unique compared to institutions and games is its endless fecundity and remarkable elaboration of some basic numerical and geometrical structural conceptions. To begin with, mathematical objects exist only as conceived to be elements of such basic structures. The direct apprehension of these leads one to speak of truth in a structure in a way that may be accepted uncritically when the structure is such as the integers but may be put into question when the conception of the structure is less definite as in the case of the geometrical plane or the continuum, and should be put into question when it comes to the universe of sets. One criticism of conceptual structuralism that has been made is that it's not clear/definite what mathematical concepts are clear/definite, and making that a feature of the philosophy brings essentially subjective elements into play. 12 Actually, conceptual structuralism by itself, as presented in the theses 1-10, takes no specific position in that respect and recognizes that different judgments (such as mine) may be made. Once such are considered, however, logic has much to tell us in its role as an intermediary between philosophy and mathematics. There are other dimensions of mathematical practice that reward metamathematical study Strahm (2000, 2010) for schematic systems of non-finitist and finitist arithmetic, resp., and by Buchholtz (2013) for arithmetical inductive definitions. As initiated in Feferman (1996) , I am optimistic that it can be used to elaborate Gödel's program for new axioms in set theory and in particular to draw a sharper line between which such axioms ought to be accepted on intrinsic grounds and those to be argued for on extrinsic grounds.
13 These kinds of logical results can also be used to throw substantive light on philosophical discussions as to the problem of quantification over everything (or over all ordinals, or all sets) such as are found in Rayo and Uzquiano (2006) .
